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Introduction 
 
This paper presents an account of evidence I provided in an English libel action in 1992 
regarding the meaning of the expression 'economical with the truth'. The interest of such a 
description, I suggest, lies in the fact that the contested expression poses difficulties to legal 
interpretation as a result of its origin as a quotation. Distinction between use as a formulaic 
idiom and as a more specialised allusion can become crucial within English libel law, in that 
qualification is allowed to the 'ordinary reader' test of meaning only in cases of so-called 
'innuendo' meanings (that is, meanings believed to be available only to a sub-set readership 
with relevant, specialised knowledge).  
 
Discussion in this paper of semantic and pragmatic evidence suggests that the linguist can 
valuably narrow the scope of plausible interpretations of contested expressions. Such 
evidence may also contribute to more general understanding of both 'ordinary reader' and 
'innuendo' tests of meaning. Generalising from the particular case outlined, I comment finally 
on established means of attributing meanings (and responsibility for meaning) in legal cases, 
and delineate emergent tendencies in the related fields of forensic linguistics and critical legal 
studies. 
 
Meaning in the courts 
 
In cases of defamation (whether of slander, which is the spoken form, or of libel, which is the 
written form
1
), defamatory meaning is not essentially a matter of intention. Rather, it inheres 
in whatever an expression, in what is sometimes referred to as 'its ordinary signification', 
would mean to 'right-thinking members of society generally'. It is this aspect of libel law 
which explains, for example, how it is possible for there to be occasional actions for 
'unintended libel': defamation is viewed as a fact, or demonstrated effect, rather than a 
supposed intention
2
. 
 
Whether an expression is defamatory or not is determined by means of a two-stage process. 
The presiding judge decides whether the expression is capable of bearing a libellous 
meaning; this is a matter of law. It is then for the jury to decide whether the expression in 
question does in fact bear such a libellous meaning in the case pleaded before them. 
 
Capability to bear a libellous meaning is decided, as has been suggested, on the basis of the 
'ordinary reader' test. That ordinary reader is not, however, someone with only narrow or 
literal interpretative skills. Rather, such a reader is 
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endowed... with considerable wisdom and knowledge of the way of the world. The 
literal meaning is not conclusive: the ordinary reader knows all about irony. [....] The 
ordinary reader is impressed by the tone and manner of publication, and the words 
chosen to headline the story.[...] The courts accept that ordinary readers are not literal-
minded simpletons. They are capable of divining the real thrust of a comment, and 
able to respond to a joke, even a joke in bad taste, in the spirit intended by the 
commentator (Robertson and Nichol, 1984:28-9). 
  
In this respect, it is interesting that, despite the clearly stated primacy of the notion of effect, 
the author's attributed intention is still relevant; the above quotation continues, 'the author's 
intention does play an indirect part in determining the meaning of the words in question, 
because that meaning is decided by the ordinary reader's response to the question:  "What on 
earth is the author getting at?"'(Robertson and Nichol, 1984:29). 
 
The 'ordinary reader' test is subject, however, to qualification in the sub-set of cases involving 
so-called 'innuendo meanings'. Such meanings derive from expressions which are not 
defamatory at face value, but which nevertheless carry discreditable implications to those 
with specialized, rather than general, knowledge. The concept of defamatory innuendo allows 
a statement to be deemed defamatory on the strength of its meaning to those with knowledge 
of relevant circumstances not themselves stated. In such cases, the ordinary reader test is 
overruled by a concept of 'meaning for the reader with knowledge of the relevant facts'.  
 
Court process 
 
How, then, is the expert linguist likely to become involved? To understand at what stages 
linguistic expertise might be drawn on, it is necessary to understand the overall process of an 
English libel action. 
 
Libel cases (in English law) take the following general form. The plaintiff has to demonstrate 
three things: first, that the words complained of do have a defamatory meaning; second, that 
the words refer to the plaintiff; and third, that the defendant was responsible for publishing 
them (in cases of innuendo meaning, the plaintiff also has to prove that the article was in fact 
published to persons who were able to make the identifying connection). Once these matters 
are established, the burden of demonstration shifts to the defendant, who must convince the 
judge and/or jury (but only on balance of probability, not beyond reasonable doubt) that the 
words were true, or the comment was fair (or honest), or that the report was 'privileged', or - 
far less commonly - that there had been consent.
3
  
 
Matters of law are for lawyers; linguists' expertise is correspondingly directed towards a 
narrow and precise channel of application. While it is conceivable that an expert witness 
might be helpful in distinguishing 'statements of fact' from 'opinions' in an 'honest comment' 
defence, the limited role for linguists in English libel typically occurs, if at all, during the first 
stage of the legal process described above. The question for the linguist - argued initially 
before the judge as a matter of law rather than before a jury - is most likely to be whether an 
expression is reasonably capable of carrying a defamatory meaning. It is a complex instance 
of such an argument which I report below.  
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Defining an appropriate research method 
 
The libel action in which the phrase 'economical with the truth' was complained of involved 
an editorial article in which the phrase was used to describe the behaviour of a prominent 
businessman.  The phrase occurred within a piece which overall contrasted an alleged failure 
to disclose essential information with a public right of information. The businessman pleaded 
in his statement of claim that the expression 'economical with the truth', in context, carried 
the meaning of dishonourable concealment and misconduct, and as such conveyed 
discreditable implications regarding his professional probity. In defence of the article, the 
publishers proposed to argue - not that the suggestion was true or that it was fair comment -
but straightforwardly that it is mistaken to assume that the expression 'economical with the 
truth' involves any derogatory, and therefore potentially libellous, import; rather, they 
maintained, it may even convey an element of praise. 
 
In developing my initial report on the meaning of the expression, it was essential to consider 
both the 'ordinary reader' and 'innuendo' possibilities. I examined not only the apparent 
meaning of the phrase in context, which would later be a matter for the court to determine, 
but also its history and patterns of more general current usage.  
 
The origin of the phrase as a quotation, and so the fact that it may be argued to function as an 
allusion, poses special interpretative difficulties. An 'innuendo' effect would depend on the 
recognizability of the literary or cultural reference to a given readership, and so the probable 
generation of inferences specifically associated with or derived from that reference. But 
allusions, like metaphors, also become sedimented in the language and take on a life of their 
own, to the extent that their meaning in a given context cannot be simply read off from an 
'original' sense any more than the current meaning of a word can be derived directly from its 
etymology. An expression which begins life as a quotation may acquire an 'ordinary reader' 
meaning independent of, or which even directly cancels out, a sense earlier associated with a 
precise literary reference.  
 
Given these difficulties, it was appropriate in assessing the significance of the expression to 
adopt a combined method of enquiry which examined its history, the scale and contexts of its 
current use, and the probable interpretative horizons of readers likely to have encountered the 
expression in the article in which it was used. Accordingly, my report sought to triangulate 
evidence from  
 
(i)  literary concordances (for origins of the expression as a quotation, as well as 
influential early uses);  
(ii)  the Oxford English Dictionary and other dictionaries and reference sources 
(for the historical development of and current conventions regarding its 
meanings);  
(iii)  a transcript of relevant parts of the Spycatcher trial, held in Sydney in 1986 
(for the context in which the expression was most famously used in recent 
times, in evidence by Sir Robert Armstrong);  
(iv)  two corpora of English usage (one, an article search from the Financial Times 
Business Service covering the period 1983 - when the Service began - through 
to 1992; the other, the Survey of English Usage held at University College, 
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London, which offers a large, representative body of English discourse for 
years prior to 1986.  
(v)  a sample of English-speaker informants (for patterns in speakers' intuitions 
about contemporary usage) for intuitions of English speakers.  
 
Being 'economical with the truth' 
 
Before the mid 1980s, the phrase 'economical with the truth' appears to have had only an 
extremely restricted currency, involving a rare and very specific allusion to either or both of 
two literary sources. One of the possible allusions is to Mark Twain's, 'Truth is the most 
valuable thing we have. Let us economise it' (where the phrase involves an element of absurd 
or paradoxical humour, applying to 'truth' an evidently inappropriate system of valuation). 
The other possible allusion is to Edmund Burke's comment, 'I do not impute falsehood to the 
Government, but I think there has been considerable economy of truth', in which, through the 
rhetorical contrast established by the adversative connective 'but', a critical sense seems 
implicit.
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The phrase (as well as grammatically-related variants on it) entered widespread currency in 
English following its use by Sir Robert Armstrong, the then British Cabinet Secretary, during 
legal proceedings over Peter Wright's book Spycatcher in Sydney, Australia, in November 
1986. Although neither the individual words which make up the phrase, or even the phrase as 
a whole, was new (indeed Sir Robert Armstrong prefaced his use of the phrase with the 
words, 'as one person said'), the expression seemed to enter English usage as a sort of 
neologism: a distinctly new idiom, with it own quite particular meanings and resonances.  
 
Although Armstrong (and others subsequently) have drawn on the reference to Burke to 
establish a 'praising' meaning for the expression, senses directly modelled on the two 
references cited above could be taken to be largely immaterial in the context of the contested 
use. While over two-thirds of my questionnaire sample were familiar with the phrase from 
press and media usage (and approximately one-third could remember having used the phrase 
themselves), when given a selection of twelve possible names with which to associate the 
expression, no respondents at all associated it either with Edmund Burke or with Mark 
Twain.  
 
The history of the phrase following Armstrong's use is arguably more significant. It is 
commonly believed, for instance, that the allusive quality of the expression, in a British 
context, involves direct or oblique reference to his use of it. Even so, only a quarter of my 
sample linked the phrase directly with Armstrong. Equally interestingly, the most frequently 
chosen name associated with the expression (after Armstrong) was that of Richard Nixon, 
who is of course also widely associated with a neologistic expression, the loosely similar-
sounding phrase 'expletive deleted', as well as being widely associated in the popular mind 
with dishonesty in office.  
 
There is, however, a fairly compelling reason to link the increased use of the expression with 
the widespread media reporting of Sir Robert Armstrong's use. While there is not a single 
entry for the phrase 'economical with the truth' in the written and spoken English collected in 
the Survey of English Usage corpus (which has as its end-date 1985), there are approximately 
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450 uses simply in those national newspapers covered by the Financial Times Business 
Service corpus during the years 1986-1992. Indeed, the 450 citations show a very high 
frequency of co-occurrence between the phrase and Armstrong's name, including references 
to how Armstrong showed wit and originality in introducing the phrase: 'Sir Robert's ringing 
phrase'; his 'immortal words'; 'Sir Robert... entered the history books as the author of the 
phrase'; 'Sir Robert's remark...assured the proceedings a place in dictionaries of quotations'; 
his 'brilliant hapax legomenon'; etc. On the basis simply of the collocation evidence, it seems 
reasonable to infer that the widespread perception that the expression entered popular, 
especially journalistic and media, currency as a result of Sir Robert Armstrong's single use of 
it is substantially correct.  
 
Spycatcher 
 
To understand the contemporary meaning (or meanings) of the term, accordingly, it was 
necessary to consider the context of Sir Robert Armstrong's use of it in 1986. Cross-examined 
by Malcolm Turnbull during the Spycatcher trial, Sir Robert Armstrong was questioned about 
whether in fact the Government of the day already had a copy of Spycatcher, when it 
represented in a letter to the publisher William Armstrong that it did not. The courtroom 
dialogue continued: 
 
Q: So that letter contains a lie, does it not? 
A: It contains a misleading impression in that respect. 
Q: Which you knew to be misleading at the time you made it? 
A: Of course. 
Q: So it contains a lie? 
A: It is a misleading impression, it does not contain a lie, I don't think. 
Q: What is the difference between a misleading impression and a lie?  
A: You are as good at English as I am.  
Q: I am just trying to understand. 
A: A lie is a straight untruth. 
Q: What is a misleading impression - a sort of bent untruth? 
A: As one person said, it is perhaps being economical with the truth. 
 
During the immediately surrounding cross-examination, Turnbull tests Armstrong with what 
amounts to a series of possible glosses for the expression ('lie or convey a misleading 
impression', 'misrepresenting facts', 'misstate the facts', '[the letter was] written so as not to 
disclose the fact', 'mislead people'), to the extent that the presiding judge at one point presses 
the cross-examination forward with the comment that, 'We may have fallen into an exercise 
in semantics'.  
 
As a result of widespread international interest in the Spycatcher trial, (and in Sir Robert 
Armstrong's evidence in particular), the phrase 'economical with the truth' passed into popular 
usage - a fashion given new impetus when Armstrong was made Lord Armstrong of Ilminster 
a year or so later. It is clear nevertheless that, despite his elevation, Lord Armstrong's 
reputation was not generally enhanced by his court appearance. He is reported as having 
'made the Government look silly'; he 'achieved notoriety when he admitted being economical 
with the truth'; and his 'string of embarrassing, headline-making admissions' made 'the man 
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who is popularly called Britain's most powerful civil servant appear ill-at-ease, ineffectual 
and ill-informed'. In fact, Lord Armstrong's name came to be widely seen as synonymous with 
an idea of parsimony with the resource of 'truth'; his name, and the expression with which it 
became associated (whether used of him or of someone else) entered popular mythology as a 
symbol of only half-apologetic official dishonesty.  
 
Current usage 
 
The principal question for the forensic linguist involved in a defamation action remains, 
however: what sense or senses had the phrase, once in wider and unattributed contemporary 
currency, become capable of meaning in the context in which it had been used?  
 
Judging on the basis of my corpus, and in the light of responses to my survey, I arrived at the 
view that the phrase means overwhelmingly to be deliberately misleading, by misrepresenting 
(or omitting to represent) an actual and relevant state of affairs. The phrase may have started 
life as a polite, even subtle, euphemism, but subsequently became a transparent figurative 
expression meaning to deceive or lie, especially the concealment of discreditable or 
unprofessional conduct by people in public office. While Lord Armstrong has continued to 
maintain that the expression means 'leaving unsaid things which might be embarrassing and 
which ought to be kept secret from the public', even the interviewer to whom he originally 
offered this opinion went on to report, 'To most people it is a Civil Service euphemism for 
telling lies'. 
 
Evidence for the 'lying' sense can be found fully across my data. As has been suggested 
above, there was no correlation among my respondents between knowing a literary origin for 
the phrase and attributing a meaning to it. This suggests strongly that the phrase has 
established itself within the language beyond those local contexts in which it could plausibly 
function as a specific allusion. To test the scope of possible meanings further, I invited my 
sample to choose between alternative possible glosses. While nearly 10% thought it could 
mean an amount of succinct paraphrase or précis, or some degree of oversight or accidental 
omission, 80% maintained that it necessarily involved some degree of deliberate deception. 
My questionnaire also invited comment on a scenario in which the respondent herself or 
himself is judged to have been 'economical with the truth'. Given four graded alternatives, 
over two-thirds felt it would mean they had lied about something. Asked how they would 
interpret such an expression as a comment on their own character, only 4% of respondents 
considered that it conveyed high praise or praise; 13% deemed it a neutral observation; while 
80% felt it entailed criticism, strong criticism or insult.
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Questionnaire data of this kind tallied closely with corpus evidence, especially analysis of 
patterns of co-occurrence of words and phrases which in context offer approximate 
synonyms, reformulatory 'glosses', cognate concepts, semantic scales, or suggestive contrasts. 
Such patterning of restatements and opposites offers helpful bearings on, and can further 
anchor, the meaning a speaker appears to be giving an expression. 
 
Among the clusters of speaker-synonyms for the phrase 'economic with the truth' in the 
corpus, for instance, were 'slithering around with the facts'; uttering 'patent nonsense'; 'not 
revealing the facts or the complete truth'; indulging in 'weasel evasion'; turning 'the English 
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Language inside out in an effort to hide the more negative aspects of [something]'; or even a 
rough paraphrase attributed to Prince Philip, to 'fiddle with the truth'. Rhetorical contrasts 
included: 'Mr Dennis Howarth...accused the board of being "economical with the truth". 
Either you don't know your jobs or you are not telling the truth.'. A similar contrast, in the 
following quotation, underscores a link between being 'economical with the truth' and 'lying': 
'Mr Bush's image-makers have been plastering the inaugural events with T-shirts and posters 
and plastic cups that bear the faces of the first President who "could not tell a lie", and the 
newest incumbent, whose election campaign last year was so economical with the truth'. 
Scalar effects, produced by the sequence of items in a list, locate the meaning of the 
expression, too (in this case, in a scale of degrees of deception): 'being economical with the 
truth' lies close to, but may be slightly less than, outright lying, as a result of the official 
authority with which it is performed; this can be detected in hedging qualifications such as, 'at 
best economical with the truth, at worst a liar'  or 'at best contradictory, at worst economical 
with the truth'. A more dramatic scale of distinctions, however - which clearly identifies 
where on the emotional and moral spectrum being 'economical with the truth' is to be located 
- is the following: 'Ollie North and Robert Armstrong in The Good, The Bad, The Ugly and 
The Economical with the Truth'. 
 
Other textual features in the corpus reinforce the sense indicated above. The class of verbs 
and verbal expressions on which the phrase is typically grammatically dependent generally 
carries negative moral overtones, and includes 'is accused of', 'admits to being', 'is guilty of', 
'creates the suspicion that'. Or again, titles of articles within which the expression occurs 
provide a generic framework for understanding the expression in a given passage. Under a 
title, 'Body language: the tell-tale signs of a liar', we are told, 'He's not lying but he is leaving 
out a crucial piece of information - "being economical with the truth", as they say', where the 
phrase 'as they say' points to euphemistic and figurative qualities of the expression. And in a 
suggestive series of associative links, under a heading 'Life and times: Lie of the land in the 
land of the lie', we learn of, '...the comforting zeitgeist [of the 1980s] which promoted the lie 
as a way of life. But politicians are economical with the truth. Robert Armstrong...'.  
 
Stylistic parody, too, highlights the sense of concealment by understatement, and so 
reinforces the derogatory resonance of the expression. Consider the parallelism between the 
two sentences in the following quotation: 'You may prefer to say that you are economical with 
the truth. You may declare grandly that you have been known to utter the odd terminological 
inexactitude'; or the analogy drawn in, 'Following Lord Armstrong's efforts during the 
Spycatcher trial, in which he confessed to being "economical with the truth", the word is now 
defined as "deliberately withholding something from public knowledge". Similarly, "dead 
parrot", once applied to Liberal party leader David Steel, is "something irrevocably 
moribund"'. Cases such as these draw attention to what is seen as an inadequacy in the 
innocuous nature of particular phrases to convey the seriousness of the failings they allude to. 
 
Finally, larger discourse patterns, often combining a number of the stylistic features described 
above, build up not only a fairly consistent specific sense but also a recurrent set of weaker 
but equally suggestive connotations and implications: 'economical with the truth, or lenient 
with lies'; 'it is risky to be economical with the truth.. false pretences.. get away with a lie'; 
'economical with the truth... entirely unscrupulous'; '...was economical with the truth. Neither 
can he now do a Pontius Pilate...'; '"economical with the truth", as he [Sir Robert Armstrong, 
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'the man who gave lying a good name'] put it, will now be used by anybody accused of 
holding back information or misleading or even lying'; 'You and I, to our shame, tell lies. But 
governments are different. They are merely economical with the truth'; 'The Government may 
also extend the Trade Description Act to cover the tendency of some estate agents to be 
"economical with the truth" when describing a property'; 'This may be a high-tech way of 
being economical with the truth. Alternatively, could it be that there are lies, damned lies and 
facsimiles?'; or finally the vividly code-switching, 'I have to say that sounds to me not so 
much a case of being "economical with the truth" as telling what, in Cockney rhyming slang, 
is known as a "pork pie".... 
 
Could the conventional meaning be overridden? 
 
The two kinds of evidence outlined in brief above (empirical evidence from a survey of 
speakers, and linguistic analysis of a large corpus of published usage) clearly support the view 
that the generally accepted current meaning of the expression is what might be called the 
'professional lie' meaning (the loose equivalent of a professional foul in football). Used of 
people in office, the expression would appear therefore almost invariably to carry a 
discrediting implication, imputing dishonesty or dishonourable conduct and so lowering the 
person in public esteem and at the same time ridiculing him or her.  
 
Such a meaning is not in any simple sense an 'innuendo' meaning, of course. Rather, I have 
suggested that the originally innuendo meaning (the literary allusion almost certainly 
accessible only to those with a particular educational background) has become, through a 
process of language change, a naturalized idiom, functioning irrespective of the availability of 
the innuendo sense. Given the slippery nature of allusive, ironic, or innuendo possibilities, 
however, I felt I should in constructing my report also consider whether there might be 
circumstances in which the 'deception' or 'deliberately misleading' meaning I had established 
could be overridden by context. I identified four main possibilities to evaluate (a to d below); 
but felt that each finally could be discounted.  
 
a. In using the expression, a speaker or writer might wish to invert or reverse the 
conventionalised idiom, and instead invoke a particular sense associated with Burke 
(or Twain). For a meaning associated with these sources to be activated, however, 
some explicit reference to one or other author seems to be necessary if the far more 
immediate and accessible allusion to Spycatcher, which would undoubtedly be 
inferred as a sort of default context by an ordinary contemporary reader or listener, is 
to be cancelled. The current remoteness of the Burke reference, in fact, is signalled in 
Lord Armstrong's own more recent effort to be 'economical with words - although I 
hope not economical with the truth, save in the sense recommended by Edmund 
Burke' - a formulation which ironically confirms the general meaning and negative 
overtones of his earlier expression, 'economical with the truth'.  Without an explicit 
reference to Burke or Twain, my survey suggests, an allusion to them would be 
extremely unlikely to be recognized. (Significantly, too, the Burke quotation cited 
above is not to be found in any of the dictionaries of quotations on sale in bookshops 
included in my informal survey.) 
 
b. In using the expression, a speaker or writer might be appealing to a 'conspiratorial' 
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sense, in which the speaker presumes on the part of addressees a belief system in 
which deliberately misleading the public will be seen as a positive virtue. This 
possibility, however, depends on a mutual assumption that deliberately misleading 
statements are a right-thinking way of behaving, and do not escape the charge of being 
defamatory (since the belief-system presumed in defamation is that of 'right-thinking' 
people).
6
 In my survey, it is interesting nevertheless that a significant number of 
respondents saw the phrase as being less damaging to character or self-esteem in a 
hypothetical situation in which they were ascribing the tendency to be 'economical 
with the truth' to their own behaviour than in a situation in which the expression was 
used by someone else about them - where the criticism or insult effect was generally 
felt to be clear. 
 
c. In using the expression, a speaker or writer might be seeking to contrive a neutrally 
humorous or ironic meaning, in which the phrase creates incongruity by being applied 
as it were in reverse, with the literal rather than the figurative seeming the surprise 
interpretation. A rare example of this type in the corpus might be 'To be economical 
with the truth, the core of market analysis can be expressed in three words: prices 
affect quantities', where the context makes clear that 'economic' refers only to number 
of words, without any detectable implication regarding what else should have been 
said. The artifice of this type of use, it should be noted, lies precisely in the way it 
exploits familiarity with (and indeed expectation of) the deprecatory sense in order to 
create a surprise effect with the reversal to a flat 'literal' interpretation. 
 
d. In using the expression, a speaker or writer might be illustrating a more general 
commentary on 'our times' or the state of the language, by alluding to a socially 
damaging culture of political euphemism. In such a view, a lexicon of what might be 
called, following Winston Churchill's expression while a minister at the Colonial 
Office in 1906, 'terminological inexactitudes' disguises bureaucratic remoteness, 
corruption, and dishonesty. An example of this type in the corpus is the following 
comment on the idea that being 'economical with the truth' involves a 'weasel evasion': 
'George Orwell recommended that we should inoculate ourselves against the litotes 
disease by memorising the sentence, "A not unblack dog was chasing a not unsmall 
rabbit across a not ungreen field". Orwell was an Englishman who did not suffer from 
the English vices of hypocrisy, evasion and understatement'. Such a usage does not, 
however, free the expression from the capability to defame, since the comment on 
political euphemism is predicated on a serious objection to the kind of political 
behaviour it (mis)represents.  
 
Each of the four cases I identified was extremely rare in the corpus I consulted. What is 
perhaps more significant, in any case, is that each relies on, and so in its own way reinforces, 
the underlying polemical sense of the expression rather than cancelling it out. Departing from 
the corpus, too, it was also notable how difficult it is even to construct plausible contexts in 
which that critical sense can be reversed rather than presumed as a sub-stratum beneath an 
additional ironic twist.  
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Conclusions 
 
The 'ordinary reader' test in defamation actions dispenses with psychological or philosophical 
complexity, and replaces such difficulties with the reassuring sense of a judge and jury readily 
knowing what discourse means. The evidence reported in summary above, by contrast, is 
likely to seem complex and technical in ways which conflict with the general spirit of 
reasonable action which characterises the law of tort, of which defamation is a part. Indeed, 
the sense conveyed by linguistic technicality that the meanings of utterances may be multi-
dimensional and sometimes difficult to establish can render linguistic evidence especially 
unappealing to English law and lawyers. It is appropriate, therefore, to conclude with some 
more general reflections on the research reported above, and the prevailing notion of legal 
meaning in relation to which it was commissioned. 
 
Firstly, it is reasonable to ask how effective in court proceedings the sort of evidence linguists 
might provide can be. In the case reported, when linguistic evidence on the capability of the 
expression to bear a defamatory meaning was judged admissible and passed to the defence 
team, a settlement out of court substantially in favour of the plaintiff was quickly arranged. 
But presentation of such evidence raises broader questions than those of immediate outcomes. 
For practising linguists, perhaps the most immediate questions regarding legal consultancy in 
the area of defamation are those of admissibility. The 'ordinary reader' test conflicts quite 
fundamentally with any appeal to commissioned, specialist leverage on questions of meaning; 
unless the case reported had been pleaded in terms of an innuendo meaning, what the 
expression 'economical with the truth' is capable of meaning might simply have been 
determined on the spot by a judge. An important question which arises is accordingly how the 
extent to which linguists could in principle usefully contribute to the process of determining 
meanings can be reconciled with given limitations on the admissibility of such evidence in 
court. 
 
At present, it is only in the minority of libel cases alleging innuendo meanings (or where the 
so-called 'ordinary signification' of a word or statement is in doubt) that capability to bear a 
meaning is likely to be argued with the help of a linguist. It is not clear, however, that such 
cases, theoretically considered, in fact constitute a minority. With allusions in particular, there 
may as I have suggested be a risk of confusing two co-existing but divergent meanings, only 
one of which retains a link with the quotation.  
 
To generalise from such cases, the principle might be argued that meanings are always 
representations constructed within a matrix of demographic variables and in circumstances of 
language variation and change. As such, meanings spread, and are distributed, in complex and 
uneven ways. Consequently, heterogeneous readerships (or 'interpretive communities') are the 
general rather than an exceptional condition. Even the illustration offered by Robertson and 
Nichol to exemplify the working of the 'ordinary reader' test (contained in a sentence omitted 
from the abbreviated quotation presented above) demonstrates this. After pointing out that the 
ordinary reader knows all about irony, Robertson and Nichol suggest, 'To say of John Smith 
"His name is certainly not George Washington" is capable of being defamatory of Smith: the 
ordinary reader knows that George Washington could never tell a lie, and is likely to infer that 
Smith is therefore untruthful'. (Robertson and Nichol, 1984:28). It is problematic, however, 
how far the 'George Washington's honesty' cultural reference is widely recognizable, or any 
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more part of general knowledge than the Beatles or many of the other cultural entities whose 
existence or social meaning has been famously queried by English judges. 
 
The general point is this: it is only by presuming an idealised notion of 'general' or 'standard' 
usage (often a conservative variety, linked to a specific, socially and educationally 
constructed notion of what is common knowledge) that the notion of the 'ordinary reader' can 
be sustained. If the interpretation of an expression is to include not only its linguistically-
coded meanings but also those inferences reasonably triggered by its combination with the 
specific, anticipated assumptions of addressees (which is, after all, the accepted basis of 
defamatory meaning), then most or even all interpretations are likely to have a significant 
'innuendo' dimension. In a linguistically and culturally diverse society, the burden of 
argument must increasingly fall on counsel to disentangle and establish which words mean 
what to whom. 
7
 
 
It is unlikely, of course, that English courts will question their own ability to judge the 
meanings of words, or the basis of legitimate or warranted inference. Rules on expert witness 
are likely to continue to be defined in ways which reinforce rather than query the court's 
authority in the matter of what utterances mean. For this reason, it is likely to continue to be a 
matter of linguistic rather than legal interest how far oblique rhetorical strategies (such as 
metaphor, allegory, allusion, or irony) - all exemplary in satire, and frequent visitors to the 
courts - expose questions of interpretation to fundamental problems concerning the social 
distribution of different kinds of interpretation. Such considerations challenge the 
'ordinariness' of any reader, as well as the representativeness of the judge's deliberations, and 
demand more nuanced, and better informed, debate about patterns of usage, trends in public 
literacy, and the interpretative horizons at stake in acts of social discourse. 
 
Two emphases in forensic linguistics in matters of defamation can be identified. In one, the 
linguist simply unpacks her or his specialist tool-kit on demand, leaving broader issues of 
legal context and procedure to lawyers. In the other, linguists make a contribution to cases 
within constraints determined by current legal procedure, but also endeavour - in ways 
compatible with the more philosophical and rhetorical concerns of critical legal discourse 
analysis
8
 - to contribute their own, sometimes different (and occasionally polemical) insights 
into language and meaning. The future and value of forensic linguistics in the field of 
defamation will be importantly defined by the relationship which develops between these two 
tendencies. 
 
 
 
         Sept 1995
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Notes 
 
1. The basic distinction between slander and libel concerns the presumed greater 
seriousness of an aspersion in permanent form (a libel) than in a transitory one (a 
slander). For a case of alleged slander to be actionable, the plaintiff has accordingly to 
demonstrate financial loss rather than simply damage to reputation. Development in 
the twentieth century of new technologies of transmission, broadcasting and 
reproduction has complicated what was earlier generally a distinction between writing 
and speech - although argument had previously established statues, caricatures, 
effigies, chalk marks on a wall, signs and pictures to be all capable of being libellous 
(see, for example, the judgement in Monson v Tussauds Ltd [1891-4]). Youssoupoff v 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Pictures Ltd [1934], in which the plaintiff alleged that she, as 
'Natasha' in a film, had been seduced by Rasputin, established that 'speech which is 
synchronized with the photographic reproduction and forms part of one complex, 
common exhibition as a circumstance' constitutes a libel rather than slander. 
Subsequently, distinctions surrounding broadcasting and theatrical performance were 
more fully codified in the Defamation Act 1952 and in the Theatres Act 1968 (though 
unscripted remarks made on live television may still be regarded as slander; for 
discussion and illustration of the distinctions, see Hepple and Matthews (1980:548-
552); for a recent account of libel law internationally, see Braithwaite (1995).  
 
2. See Robertson and Nichol, 34-36. Perhaps the most succinct statement of the position 
is Lord Justice Greer's, in Cassidy v Daily Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1929]: 'Liability 
for libel does not depend on the intention of the defamer, but on the fact of the 
defamation.' See Hepple and Matthews (1980:557).  
 
3. Several features of English libel law (whose concern to protect the interest of 
reputation has historical origins in the social need to provide a legal alternative to 
duelling) are well known even outside legal circles: the right to trial by jury; the fact 
that legal aid is not available; the vast disparity in damages awarded, from massive 
exemplary damages to derisory, so-called 'contemptuous damages' which leave the 
successful plaintiff at a substantial loss because the scale of legal costs; and the 
possibility of issuing an apology admissible in evidence in mitigation of damages. For 
more detailed discussion of court procedures, however, see Robertson and Nichol 
(1984:23-64), and Hepple and Matthews (1980:568-587). Of the defences against 
libel, 'fair comment' is both most common and seemingly most problematic, not only 
because it can be defeated by demonstrating legally defined 'malice', but also because 
precise distinctions between comment and the facts on which comment is based are 
not always easy to draw. For the pragmaticist, perhaps the most tantalising distinction 
is that conveyed in judgement of London Artists Ltd v Littler [1969] between defences 
of fair comment and justification: 'In fair comment, he [the defendant] need only 
prove the basic facts to be true. In justification he must prove also that the comments 
and inferences are true also.' See Hepple and Matthews (1980:571). 
 
4. In the Oxford English Dictionary [OED] entry for 'economy' [sense III, 6b]), the 
following quotation is also offered: 'Falsehood and delusion are allowed in no case 
whatever. But [as in the exercise of all the virtues] there is an economy of truth...a sort 
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of temperance, by which a man speaks truth with reason that he may continue to speak 
it the longer' (Two Letters on Proposals for Peace, 1796, Part I, p.137). 
 
5. Largely because of pressure of time available in which to produce a report, my 
fieldwork was fairly crude. After an initial pilot, I simply conducted a small-scale 
survey involving questionnaires given to 100 respondents stratified across socio-
economic groups and age-bands. Although there was a small degree of variation 
according to socio-economic background, gender and age, such variation was very 
small by comparison with the clear overall patterns which emerged. For a detailed 
critical review of linguistic research methods (and aims), see Cameron et al (1992); 
for a history and analysis of media audience studies, arguing the case for far more 
sophisticated ethnographic approaches to reception and meaning, see Morley (1992).  
 
6. Alleged exposure of the plaintiff to hatred, ridicule and contempt is measured, in the 
words of Lord Justice Slesser in Byrne v Deane [1937], against 'the arbitrium boni, the 
view which would be taken by the ordinary good and worthy subject of the King (to 
quote the matter which appears in the old declarations)'. Damaging someone's 
reputation in the eyes of, for instance, corrupt politicians or fellow criminals, is not 
libellous. What constitutes the belief-system of the 'ordinary and worthy subject' is 
subject to change, however; it is no longer defamatory - as it has been - to call 
someone a Papist (Row v Clargis (1683)) or a German (Slazengers Ltd v Gibbs and 
Co [1916]). See Hepple and Matthews (1980: 553-4). 
 
7. In most libel actions, frequency and patterns of collocation are likely to provide 
clearest evidence to the forensic linguist; a corpus-based research methodology, along 
lines described by Coulthard (1995) is therefore most likely to be appropriate. 
Coulthard's brief account of his colleague John Sinclair's persuasive, corpus-based 
evidence regarding the meaning of the word 'visa' provides an exemplary illustration 
(Coulthard 1995:37). For a comprehensive presentation of contextual approaches to 
word meaning within lexical semantics, see Cruse (1986). In instances where 
specialised cultural reference is directly at stake, more contextualised and historical 
analysis may however be necessary; perhaps as much interesting work along such 
lines has been done in literary studies as in linguistics (c.f. Empson (1951) and 
Williams (1976), whose prodigious studies of lexical meaning drew on notes made 
manually over a long period from a large, mainly literary corpus). The concept of 
'interpretive communities' is outlined in Fish (1980); compelling discussion of the 
social distribution of meanings, conceived as an 'epidemiology of representations', can 
be found in Sperber (1985). 
 
8. For what remains a landmark study of the goals and scope of critical legal discourse 
analysis, see Goodrich (1987). 
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